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Saturday, October 31, 2009

National Geographic vs. the Syrian regime





Hussain Abdul-Hussain , October 31, 2009

In its November issue, National Geographic magazine ran a feature story on Syria, calling it the “shadowland” and challenging suggestions that the ruling regime can ever raise the country out of its dark past.

The portrait of Syria, past and present, sketched by the author, Don Belt, is indeed dark. Belt describes a nation stifled by a succession of autocrats who have prevented political, economic and social growth. The late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was involved in a massacre in Hama, the article notes, while his son and successor, Bashar, is suspected of complicity in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Bashar, like his father, remains feared inside Syria for his regime’s notorious intelligence network that has kept the Assad family in power for decades.

Given this context, it is not surprising that the author of the article makes the Godfather analogy, with Bashar Assad filling the role of Michael Corleone, the son of Don, who rises to leadership of “the family” upon the unexpected death of his hothead brother Sonny, which in Bashar’s case would be his late brother Basil.

Whatever the merits of the 3,900-word National Geographic piece, it managed to provoke a 4,250-word rebuttal from the Syrian Ambassador to the United States, Imad Moustapha.

In the typical manner of the Syrian regime, Moustapha tried first to undermine the credibility of the writer by linking him to former President George Bush, the neocons and Israel. “Reminiscent of the neoconservative literature that was prevalent during President Bush’s era,” Moustapha’s writes in his letter, which goes on to deploy the neoconservative label some seven times, four of which with the word Israeli thrown in for good measure.

Along with hurling unsubstantiated accusations, Moustapha threatens the writer and the magazine, a step also typical of the Syrian regime. “I believe that many other countries in our region will reconsider their working relationship with your organization when they are made aware of this incident,” Moustapha writes, imagining an Arab boycott of the National Geographic in solidarity with the Syrian autocracy.

But Moustapha’s letter doesn’t just attack and intimidate, it also seeks to do the impossible: prove the popular legitimacy of President Assad. As one might suspect, the very attempt ends up undermining his argument.

“[T]he University of Maryland, along with the Zogby International Polling, conducted an opinion poll in six Arab countries earlier this year (all US allies), Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Lebanon, and the UAE, which showed that President Assad was the most popular figure amongst Arab leaders,” Moustapha writes.

The fact that the evidence of popular legitimacy Moustapha chooses to cite comes from a US pollster — one whose methodology is questionable due to its small sample sizes, and which at any rate suggests at most Assad’s popularity in several Arab countries, but not the one he rules — rather than Syria’s own joke elections in 2000 and 2007 says much about Assad’s true legitimacy.

Having thus accused Belt of being part of a neo-conservative-Israeli conspiracy, warned that displeasing the Syrian regime has negative consequences around the region for the writer and his magazine, and “proved” that Assad is a popular pan-Arab hero, Moustapha now expresses surprise at how any one so fortunate to meet Assad could write such an unfavorable piece.

But how could an unknown journalist, in Moustapha’s words, meet Assad?

Bringing western journalists and academics to Damascus to meet with Assad has become a staple of the regime’s propaganda. Syrian ambassadors, like Moustapha, often meet these “opinion shapers” in person, and generously wave the visa fee while offering all manner of help for the scheduled trip – including a possible meeting with Assad.

Most of these Westerners end up meeting Assad’s wife, who clearly impresses visitors with her cordial manners and Western education. The effect is that many such visitors later become Assad’s defenders.

The New Yorker’s Seymor Hersh was granted such close access that he later reported that he was next to Assad when news broke that Hariri had been murdered. Eric Follath, the author of Der Spiegel’s controversial piece on alleging that Hezbollah was involved in the Hariri assassination, meanwhile, publicly boasted about his ties to Assad. For Academic David Lesch, his meetings with Assad led to his book, The Lion of Damascus. Rob Malley, of the International Crisis Group, often mentions this or that meeting with the Syrian president.

Almost all of Assad’s visitors have become his admirers. But Belt, surprisingly to Moustapha, broke the rule.

Moustapha’s original expectations of Belt could be easily gleaned from the rebuttal: “He should have discussed the mosques and churches… He should have described the over 120 boutique restaurants… he would note that Syria is actually ‘cozying up’ to Turkey… He [did] not interview someone from, say the Syrian Young Entrepreneurs Association.”

When Moustapha received Belt in his office in Washington to give him a visa, he probably “suggested” people to be interviewed, all of whom are the regime’s protégés, in addition to Assad himself. Even though Belt was unknown to Moustapha, the Syrian ambassador probably reasoned that Damascus can always benefit from a pre-planned piece in the National Geographic, at the time the Syrian regime is fighting nail and tooth to win some of the US administration’s attention.

When Belt’s article described Syria and its dictatorship more accurately than Moustapha had expected, the Syrian ambassador received a stern scolding from Damascus and had to rectify the situation by writing a rebuttal that was more incriminating to the Syrian regime than vindicating.

And for all those who could not finish the seemingly endless Moustapha response, rest assured that the Syrian ambassador never refuted Belt’s accusations that the Syrian dictatorship had further tightened its grip by censoring Facebook, YouTube and a dozen other websites. Nor did Moustapha deign to answer the questions about the fate of the activists of the Damascus Spring.

After all, there are limits to how much tyranny an eloquent and intellectual Syrian ambassador can cover in one written document.

The article in NOW Lebanon

Monday, October 26, 2009

The consensus fallacy


Hussain Abdul-Hussain , October 26, 2009

Pioneers in their own minds, the Lebanese have introduced concepts to the world of political philosophy by chewing up recognized principles and spitting them out with a hint of Lebanese peculiarity.

The result is a paralyzed state beset by perpetual political deception.

The most famous of Lebanese invention has been the concept of “Consensus Democracy.” The expression itself is an oxymoron. While the word consensus means the approval of all parties involved, democracy means the rule of the majority.

Lebanon has exported its brand of democracy to neighboring states, such as Iraq, where the parliament has repeatedly failed to pass an election law for the vote, which is scheduled for January. Just as a failing Lebanese parliament delegated its problems to an even more incapacitated forum, the “Dialogue Table,” the Iraqis often take their stalemates to a so-called “Political Council for National Security.”

As that name would suggest, the Iraqi council is no more than a powerless gathering for the country’s top leadership.

Here in Lebanon, MP Michel Aoun and his crew certainly win the prize for the most creative twists of political concepts.

Proportionality means that in a parliamentary election the amount of seats a political party wins is proportional to the percent of votes it receives. Such a concept guarantees wider representation, as opposed to Lebanon’s bloc-vote system, where a single vote decides who wins between two candidates with equal popular appeal.

The Aounists, however, never proposed proportionality for the June elections. Had they done so, Aoun would have lost at least two of the five seats that he swept in Kesrouan, for example.

Knowing that proportional elections would break the monopoly he seeks over Christian representation, Aoun restricted his demands to the formation of the cabinet, perhaps a precedent in the history of government politics, especially given that Aoun’s opponents command a majority in parliament and could, in principle, form a cabinet without him.

Even more entertaining are the continuous demands from Aoun and his allies that Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri forget the results of the June elections, in which March 14 defeated Aoun and the March 8 coalition.

But if Aoun was so keen to forget the results of the June elections, how come he complained that his parliamentary bloc had expanded from 22 to 27, which he said mandates that his ministerial bloc be accordingly increased from five to six ministers?

In parliamentary elections and cabinet formations, it seems, numbers and proportionality only count when they give Aoun more, and to that end the Aounists are ready to obstruct cabinet formation and sabotage – with their allies in Hezbollah – the whole country.

And if Aoun’s dance around proportionality was not enough, the Kesrouan MP has repeatedly lectured the Lebanese about the constitution, which, in his mind, is being breached by the successive Sunni prime ministers. These men, according to Aoun, have undermined the Lebanese state by controlling the Finance Ministry for the better part of a decade and a half.

To destroy a country, as Aoun and his supporters argue, one needs to dominate its economic direction. Having a militia with tens of thousands of rockets and a couple of thousand of fighters, who would not hesitate to kill their political opponents, is a force of regional justice, per Aoun.

What is missing from Aoun’s dishonest rhetoric, however, can be always found in that of his allies. Hezbollah, for instance, slanders anyone who dares talk to an American ambassador or delegate. But when Washington’s delegates find their way to Damascus or hold talks with their Iranian counterparts, one cannot but detect a sly smile on the face of news anchors on Al Manar.

Hezbollah, the champion of consensus in cabinet, has never shared what it deems to be Shia issues. Speaker Nabih Berri was re-elected in June, whether the March 14 majority liked it or not. Similarly, the “arms of resistance” are staying, regardless of what non-Hezbollah supporters think. This, to Hezbollah, is consensus.

Likewise, talking to Israel – even through the UN to win back the Shebaa Farms – is an act of espionage, unless Hezbollah does it to free Samir Kuntar.

With Aoun and Hezbollah hypocrisy runs high. No wonder Hariri has, since June 27, been unable to form a cabinet. The state will remain on hold, until Aoun and his allies decide otherwise. This, they call partnership, again giving the word a new meaning.

With Aoun and Hezbollah, political concepts are redefined and everything else takes a whole new meaning. This is Lebanon’s “unique experience,” which others simply call the absurd.


The story in NOW Lebanon